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It should come as no surprise to critics and consumers of popular culture 
that the attacks of September 11, 2001, were, in many ways, a media event. 
While a few thousand trapped in planes and smoking buildings experienced the 
attacks firsthand, and millions of New Yorkers witnessed the events from their 
city streets, billions more know of the events only through screens of various 
sizes, and through the page. Since that time, public figures and public intellectuals 
have engaged in an interpretive tug-o-war to define, or not define, this starkly 
emotional event, which has come to be encapsulated in the ideographic moniker 
“9/11.” Cultural critics as diverse as Bill Maher and Susan Sontag paid the price 
early on for daring to posit “unacceptable” viewpoints, while seemingly the 
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vast majority of mediated information conformed to political and public senti-
ments that decontextualized the attacks, classifying them as unprovoked “evil.” 
What has been written in the past decade, either representing the events of 9/11 
or critiquing those representations, could fill several libraries. For this essay, I 
will examine two books, recently published, that give scholarly treatment to 
representations of 9/11.
The books reviewed for this essay have in common that they take popular 
culture seriously as a barometer for public attitudes, and do not get caught up in 
critical nihilism where they see popular culture as only repressive or progressive. 
Where they differ is that one focuses its rich, theoretical mining on television 
as a potential vehicle for shoring up hegemonic ideologies, while it simultane-
ously opens avenues for critique of those ideologies. The other aims for breadth 
as opposed to depth (not that its approach should be considered shallow) as it 
scrutinizes other forms of popular culture: namely, comics, literature, film, and 
performance. 
In the introduction to Stacy Takacs’ impressively researched book, Terrorism 
TV: Popular Entertainment in Post-9/11 America, the author states her position 
in contrast to those who would view media as a part of a vast conspiracy to 
control the masses:
While there is clearly a political-economic convergence of 
interest between Hollywood and Washington, however, the 
recourse to conspiracy to explain this convergence oversimpli-
fies very complex processes of social control and implies the 
public plays no role in the formation, maintenance or alteration 
of power relations. The biggest flaw in this conspiracy theory 
is its assumption that military-media coproductions always 
achieve the desired ideological effect—support for the United 
States and its military. (17)
Throughout her book, Takacs demonstrates the ways in which popular television 
post-9/11 swung from jingoistic programming that primed the public to accept 
draconian policies from the Bush administration to a proliferation of program-
ming that critiqued the administration and its hawkish war record. This shift 
suggests that public attitudes, and the relentless profit motive for commercial 
television, played at least as important a role in programming themes as did 
administration spin.
As Takacs resists easy classifications of “news” programming vs. “entertain-
ment” programming, the chapters often include analysis of both, side by side. 
As she notes in the introduction, “Rather than reimpose some false distinction 
between information and entertainment, nonfictional and fictional programming, 
my approach is to treat all program types as simultaneously entertaining and 
informative” (20). The result is a fascinating and persuasive analysis of militain-
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ment, and the subsequent resistance to militainment, as the years placed psychic 
distance between public attitudes and the event we refer to as “9/11.”
In chapter one, “9/11 and the Trauma Frame,” Takacs scrutinizes news 
reporting on the event and discusses the ways in which news media participated 
in creating what Giorgio Agamben has referred to as a permanent “state of ex-
ception.”1 She argues, 
The news media’s construction of 9/11 as an “exceptional” 
experience of unprecedented “dimensions” ripped the events 
from their historical context and permitted an interpretation of 
them in cosmic terms. A struggle between real world political 
foes became, instead, a struggle between abstract good and 
abstract evil for the soul of humanity. (36)
This framing is in keeping with characteristics of news that journalism critic 
W. Lance Bennett has elsewhere outlined, namely, that news is fragmented—
including only the latest news detached from its context—and that news is 
dramatized, or reduced to melodramatic, recognizable elements of heroes and 
villains, good and evil.2 Takacs posits that this framing played an important role 
in shoring up favorable public attitudes toward the Bush administration and 
in shaping the notion that a completely innocent nation had been attacked on 
September 11, 2001. Takacs goes on to demonstrate how fictional programming 
enhanced news reporting to create a rather distorted view of American excep-
tionalism: “By restaging the melodrama of American innocence first mobilized 
in 9/11 news coverage, Third Watch, America’s Most Wanted, and The West Wing 
all helped prime the U.S. public to support a war on terrorism” (52). All three 
programs essentially upheld the Bush administration talking points of American 
innocence and the unprovoked evil actions of the terrorists helping to create, as 
Takacs notes, a “climate of fear” that made extreme Bush administration tactics 
seem reasonable (53).
In the chapter “Spy Thrillers and the Politics of Fear,” Takacs shifts her focus 
to the plethora of programming that portrayed government agencies engaged 
in fighting a covert war on terrorism. These programs ranged in popularity and 
longevity from the short-lived The Agency and Threat Matrix, to the hugely 
popular and long-running 24. According to Takacs, what these programs have 
in common is that the way they “constructed their terrorist villains and patriotic 
heroes helped normalize the state of emergency and promote the acceptance 
of policies of surveillance, detention, interrogation, and interdiction that were 
fundamentally antidemocratic” (64). The construction of a perpetual “state of 
emergency” created not only an atmosphere where a “good” citizen relinquishes 
rights in the name of national security, but where heroes take extreme action, such 
as torture, as part of their duty in protecting American interests. Even Supreme 
Court Justice Antonin Scalia is noted by the national press to have publicly ex-
cused the actions of 24 character Jack Bauer, who routinely performs torture as 
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part of his heroic framing. With regard to the fictional government agent’s torture 
tactics, Scalia commented: “Jack Bauer saved Los Angeles . . . he saved hundreds 
of thousands of lives. . . . Is any jury going to convict Jack Bauer? I don’t think 
so.”3 If a Supreme Court justice proposes that certain actions are above the law 
in a state of emergency, is it any wonder, as Takacs’ analysis suggests, that the 
average American would come to believe the same?
Shifting from scripted dramas, in “Reality Militainment and the Virtual 
Citizen-Soldier” Takacs draws upon the scholarship of communication scholar 
Roger Stahl, among others, to take a look at “docusoaps,” or reality-based pro-
grams where soldiers in active duty are filmed to give the public an inside look 
at their daily lives. Takacs explains, 
The people at the center of these [docusoaps] are presented as 
representatives of a larger social order, but the goal of docu-
soaps is not to interrogate, explain, or alter the social order 
as a documentary might. Rather, it is to create “a spectacle of 
the everyday that emphasizes its participants’ performance of 
identity.” (105)4
These programs serve the purpose of representing soldiers as everyday, trustwor-
thy “guys-next-door,” who we can trust that their “use of force will be measured, 
precise, and discriminate, rather than gratuitous” (107). These programs were 
often produced with the explicit consent of Bush administration officials. As 
Takacs notes,
While journalists were systematically denied military assis-
tance and access to the troops, Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld personally signed off on the plan to let the produc-
ers of [Profiles from the Front Line] “[troop] around all over 
the countryside—flying on planes, going on ships, going on 
patrol with the 101st Airborne, [and] living a rugged life.” (110)
It is no wonder that the administration would sign off on such docusoaps as 
Takacs’ analysis shows they reiterated the false justification for the Iraq War by 
repeatedly making connection between Saddam Hussein and the attacks of 9/11. 
 “Fictional Militainment and the Justification of War” is an analysis of the 
popular military-themed program JAG. Here Takacs argues that the program 
attempted to remediate the past, thus making a move to actively reshape public 
memory with regard to U.S. actions in the war on terrorism. In at least one case, 
the producers of the program were given access to the Bush administration’s 
unreleased policy of using military tribunals to prosecute suspected terrorists. 
An episode of the program was thus produced, before any public debate was 
allowed to develop, the narrative of which demonstrated that military tribunals 
were the only way to prosecute detainees. Takacs points out:
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Thus, by coproducing the “Tribunal” episode of JAG, the Bush 
administration sought to intervene in and shift the ground of 
public debate about the treatment of prisoners before the courts 
could rule on the subject. It was the ultimate act of cultural 
preemption. (129)
So while militainment is nothing new, and JAG is in many ways a retread of 
past programs that glorify the military, Takacs notes: “What is new, however, is 
the series’ self-conscious intention to intervene in the formation of the cultural 
memory of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as they are happening” (140, em-
phasis in original).
 In “From Virtual Citizen-Soldier to Imperial Grunt,” Takacs explores the 
ways in which, as public approval of the Iraq War decreased, military entertain-
ment programming shifted to the glorification of the “grunt” on the ground, 
while often explicitly critiquing the out-of-touch politicians who put “him” 
there. Despite the increased critique of the war itself, war in general in these 
programs is still held to be a valid and necessary political tool, as well as serving 
the function of building character and enhancing masculinity. Takacs’ analysis 
of the programs Over There (2006) and Generation Kill (2008) argues that they
. . . portray war as a showdown between the forces of civiliza-
tion and savagery, with the survival of the human race at stake. 
This simplified morality tale is familiar to U.S. viewers from 
frontier narratives gone by and does little to provide insight 
on the specific war in Iraq. (149)
This chapter aptly demonstrates that the glorification of the military in television 
programming need not come as a direct result of Bush administration interven-
tion. Rather, the commercial aspect of programming provides all the justification 
needed for such ideologies to be packaged and sold to the American public. The 
programs demonstrate that even when public support for a particular military 
action is lacking, the military itself is considered to be above reproach. 
 With “Contesting the Politics of Fear,” Takacs’ analysis shifts to programs 
that actively criticized the Bush Administration’s ongoing wars. This chapter 
demonstrates how television programming can be used as a tool of resistance and 
not simply as a hammer for hegemonic principals. Once again, Takacs combines 
genres, resisting problematic classifications, examining programs such as The 
Daily Show With Jon Stewart, the short-lived comedy Whoopi, and the critically 
acclaimed comedy Arrested Development. The second half of the chapter is a 
careful scrutiny of a bevy of science fiction programs where American tactics 
in the war on terrorism are critiqued through analogy. One function served by 
programs such as The Daily Show, Whoopi, and Arrested Development was to 
provide a self-reflexive critique “of the media’s role in the impoverishment of 
political discourse . . . their collective use of humor for political ends did much 
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to reinvigorate a climate of public debate stifled by tragedy and political paraly-
sis on the left” (174). The science fiction programs, on the other hand—among 
them, Jericho and Lost—“sought to push the logics of fear and paranoia to their 
limits in order to deconstruct the dynamics of securitization that followed from 
the use of fear as a political stimulate post-9/11” (176). Despite these programs 
often bald critique of American policy, commercial advertising still provides the 
motivation for the entertainment industry to apply the brakes. In the case of the 
programs under consideration in this chapter, the critique, even if pointed, was 
confined the relatively safe arena of comedy and the fantasy of science fiction.
 Takacs expands her scrutiny of resistance in television programming in “The 
Body of War and the Collapse of Memory,” this time by contrasting programs 
that personalize and depoliticize war with those that do not. Takacs examines 
programs such as talk show The Montel Williams Show and reality show Extreme 
Makeover: Home Edition, both of which included programming that tended to 
focus on the pain of soldiers, and encouraged audiences to channel their anger 
away from political action and toward consumerist responses (e.g., giving a 
soldier’s home a makeover to heal his pain). Takacs sees two problems with such 
melodramatic portrayals: “One, they end up depicting U.S. soldiers as the true 
victims of U.S. military aggression . . . Two, this exclusive emotional identifi-
cation is presented as the only viable response to the historical trauma of war” 
(221). In contrast to these programs, Takacs takes a look at television series that 
deconstructed “acceptable” responses to the war. These programs, chiefly the 
network drama ER and the premium cable series Six Feet Under, “encourage 
viewers to linger with uncertainty, analyze it and work through its ramifications 
more deliberately, thereby eliciting a more active mode of historical witnessing” 
(223). These programs provide no easy, melodramatic, or consumerist solutions 
to war trauma. Rather, they use their sophisticated narratives to “open up ques-
tions about the conduct, costs, and consequences of imperial warfare” (235).
 “Trauma and Memory Ten Years Later,” the book’s epilogue, effectively 
brings home Takacs’ central theme, namely, that if television played a role in 
shaping public opinion in support of Bush administration policies, however 
extreme and draconian they proved to be, it also played a role in providing a 
space for critique of those same policies. In other words, television cannot be 
dismissed as simply the “tool of the establishment.” As Takacs puts it in a nice 
summary of the book’s themes,
By recording, transcribing, and even transcoding reality, media 
make it possible for subjects to bear witness to history them-
selves, to process and reprocess the “material of the witnessed 
world” in a provisional structure. This is not to say that TV 
functions as a neutral conduit of information about the real or 
that it conveys Truth with a capital T; rather, like memory itself, 
television is riddled with errors, blind alleys, and defensive 
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blockages; it is structured by delay and discontinuity; and it 
contains inaccurate, misleading, and partial information. (244)
Critics of television, media, or popular culture—from any disciplinary field—will 
not be disappointed with Takacs’ book. It is extremely well researched, theoreti-
cally sound, accessible to students and academics alike, and has much crossover 
appeal to those interested in public scholarship. Takacs makes no simplistic causal 
claims, and her serious treatment of perhaps the single most influential medium 
(so far) in human history is fascinating and refreshing.
 The second book I review for this essay is quite different from Takacs’ in 
both approach and format, yet there are some important similarities that make 
them excellent companion pieces for the critic of popular culture. Like Terror-
ism TV, the anthology Portraying 9/11: Essays on Representations in Comics, 
Literature, Film and Theatre is concerned with the ways in which popular culture 
shapes public perception and memory of the events that took place on September 
11, 2001. But where Terrorism TV focused exclusively on the shaping powers of 
television, Portraying 9/11 focuses on other popular culture media and excludes 
television entirely from critical consideration. Like Terrorism TV, the editors of 
Portraying 9/11 note in their introduction the role of media in the immediate 
aftermath of 9/11: “. . . media pundits and government officials quickly attempted 
to commemorate the events within recognizable conventions, relying on notions 
such as heroism, nationalism, and patriotism” (3). And while subjecting the notion 
of the exceptional nature of 9/11 to critical scrutiny, the editors and contributors 
of the anthology do not deconstruct the event to the point of dismissing it, as 
some postmodern writers arguably have done. Instead, the focus of this book is 
the examination of 9/11 as a legitimately traumatic event, involving real human 
beings, and how media provided both an outlet for mourning loss and critiquing 
response. As the editors further note: “The essays in this volume thus constantly 
remind us that memory oscillates between remembering and forgetting and is 
therefore subject to assimilation, appropriation, and even distortion” (5).
The anthology contains eleven short chapters, each contributed by a different 
author, most of whom hail from English Literature. The book is also helpfully 
divided into three parts: Comics, Literature, and Performance. The individual 
chapters stand alone nicely, offering easy reference for researchers on the hunt 
for source material. In part one, “Comics,” one chapter examines the artwork on 
several covers of the New Yorker in the months following 9/11, and two chapters 
take a look at popular superhero comics for their analogous treatment of the events 
of 9/11 and the United States’ response. In chapter one, “Covering 9/11: The New 
Yorker, Trauma Kitsch, and Popular Memory,” Timothy Krause’scareful reading 
of the New Yorker covers concludes that while “they inevitably deconstruct them-
selves and offer up—in fact, invite—politicized readings that are more complex 
and more disturbing” (14), they also tended to “posit their readers, not as active 
participants in the tragedy and memorialization of 9/11, but as passive consum-
ers of the events” (16). In chapter two, “Spandex Agonistes: Superhero Comics 
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Confront the War on Terror,” Matthew J. Costello argues that, unlike some forms 
of media that unreflexively accepted the prevailing, simplistic, Manichean frame 
posited by the Bush administration, superhero comics did not. Instead, according 
to Costello, superhero comics contested this frame in two ways: “First, the at-
tacks are not characterized as a blameless massacre of innocents by savages . . . ” 
and second, they portray “the American response not as a morally righteous act, 
but as the product of national hubris” (31). Stephan Packard, author of chapter 
three, “‘Whose Side Are You On?’ The Allegorization of 9/11 in Marvel’s Civil 
War,” supports Costello’s conclusions. Packard examines the Civil War series, 
in which Marvel’s superheroes are turned against each other in a war where one 
side represents law and order and the other represents resistance to questionable 
methods in use by the government to achieve its goals of protecting citizens. 
This unconventional use of superheroes, many of whom readers and fans might 
consider to be unquestioning supporters of the American national ethos, provides 
a powerful allegory of the problematic nature of framing the war on terrorism 
in terms of good and evil. 
 Part two, “Literature,” includes four chapters that analyze popular fiction for 
its response to and construction of the events of 9/11. In chapter four, “September 
11 and Cold War Nostalgia,” Aaron Derosa analyzes several works of fiction, 
including Don DeLillo’s Falling Man and Jonathan Safran Foer’s Extremely 
Loud and Incredibly Close, and suggests that the American public has come to 
see 9/11 in terms of a nuclear conflict. He notes,
The narrative built around 9/11 historicized the event through, 
among other things, its atomic imagery that promoted the 
reestablishment of Cold War culture, a culture whose beliefs 
and behaviors arose from the socio-cultural construction of 
a monolithic binary of “good” versus “evil” where the latter 
threatened the cultural annihilation of the former, either by 
means of nuclear holocaust, cultural and political insurgency, 
or both. (64)
A second consideration of DeLillo’s novel comes in chapter five, “Don DeL-
illo’s Falling Man: Countering Post-9/11 Narratives of Heroic Masculinity,” 
authored by Magali Cornier Michael. Cornier Michael argues that Falling Man 
deconstructs several different binaries in its pages. On the one hand, rather than 
blithely accepting the simplistic “good America vs. evil terrorist” narrative, 
Falling Man “forces its readers to grapple with the ways in which Americans 
have been complicit with vast, complex, and arguably unjust global economic 
systems that cannot be totally divorced from the horrific events of 9/11” (77). A 
second binary Cornier Michael examines is a gender binary. While others have 
forcefully and persuasively argued that post-9/11 culture reified and enforced 
notions of rugged masculinity and victimized femininity, Falling Man “seems 
to suggest that the times require the forging of new kinds of relationships that 
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move beyond outmoded, binary conceptions of masculinity and femininity and 
of the domestic and public realms” (85).5 In “Misplaced Anxieties: Violence and 
Trauma in Ian McEwan’s Saturday,” Ulrike Tancke examines a novel where 
the events of 9/11 remain on the periphery, but nonetheless operate allegori-
cally throughout. McEwan’s treatment of violence questions “the legitimacy of 
the interpretive venture which elevates 9/11 to the level of a universal turning 
point” (92). This is not to suggest that Jean Baudrillard’s deconstruction of 9/11 
as a mere “simulacrum” is a more useful interpretation of the event.6 Rather, as 
Tancke notes,
The cultural preoccupation with 9/11 and its allegedly trau-
matizing effects is a prime example of how we tend to turn 
our lives—and history more generally—into narrative, into 
a convincing story boasting turning points and life-changing 
events. (100)
This interpretive struggle is evidenced in chapter seven, the last chapter of this 
section. In “The Mediated Trauma of September 11, 2001, in William Gibson’s 
Pattern Recognition and David Foster Wallace’s ‘The Suffering Channel,’” Marc 
Oxoby takes on the Baudrillardian view of 9/11 as simulacrum, and refutes it. He 
argues, instead, that even if most of the world did not view the event firsthand, 
that does not mean that the mediated experience—even the fictionalized experi-
ence—was less authentic. Rather, through his reading of several works of fiction 
that allegorize 9/11, Oxoby argues for the value of fiction and language “to offer 
a deeper understanding of 9/11” (103), because it “deals not just in purely rational 
thought, but gives itself over to emotional responses” (116).
 Part three, “Performance,” includes analyses of film and stage plays. In the 
chapter “Terror and Mismemory: Resignifying September 11 in World Trade 
Center and United 93,” Gerry Canavan takes up the now familiar theme of the 
role of popular culture in creating a permanent state of emergency. Canavan takes 
issue, as do a number of other cultural critics, with the sanitization of 9/11 as an 
attack without bodies. From the lack of published photos or news coverage of 
9/11 “jumpers” to popular film that avoided displaying death, popular culture 
played a role in making the attack “unreal, and thus unthreatening” (124). As 
Canavan notes, “If, in World Trade Center, no one died on 9/11, in United 93 
we all did,” but, in keeping with the trend, the audience is not allowed to see it 
(129). Superheroes are given treatment again in chapter nine, but this time in 
film, and they display far less resistance to the “party line” than was the case 
in comics. In “From Flying Man to Falling Man: 9/11 Discourse in Superman 
Returns and Batman Begins,” Dan Hassler-Forest examines two blockbuster 
superhero films that nostalgically reify post-9/11 notions of heroism and victim-
ization without including the event itself as part of the narrative. What Hassler-
Forest concludes is that “although these films demonstrate the wistful desire to 
resurrect our most familiar popular icons, they also show us that we will not be 
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able to rely on superheroes to save the world in the 21st century” (145). The film 
United 93 is taken up again in chapter ten, “Authenticating the Reel: Realism, 
Simulation, and Trauma in United 93,” but this time with a more generous ap-
proach. Author Frances Pheasant-Kelly examines “realism and realist aesthetics 
in United 93,” arguing that “the film deviates from the predictable patterning of 
more conventional Hollywood cinema and how representation intersects with 
reality, blurring the boundary between them” (149). Pheasant-Kelly describes 
the film as determinedly avoiding being overly dramatic and, instead, striving 
for realism. Indeed, as no one knows what actually happened on the flight, the 
film’s realist aesthetics collapse the boundary between reality and fiction, in 
many ways making the film more “real” than news reports of the plane’s crash. 
Thus, “the recontextualization of these images within the narrative of United 93 
as simulation resurrects some of the original trauma in its close approximation to 
the real” (155). The final chapter in this section, “Connecting in the Aftermath: 
Trauma, Performance, and Catharsis in the Plays of Anne Nelson,” by James M. 
Cherry, shifts the focus from film to stage plays. Cherry’s arguments here are 
similar to those made by some of the authors in the literature section, namely, 
that language can aid audiences in working through trauma. Anne Nelson’s stage 
play, The Guys, which was fast-tracked into theaters within a few months of 9/11, 
explicitly takes on the theme of using language to work through trauma with 
its protagonist helping a firefighter construct a eulogy for his fallen comrades. 
Through incorporating the audience in some innovative ways, Anne Nelson’s 
works “instantiate that it is through connection and exchange, through people 
and cultures and nations ‘jumping tracks,’ that trauma can be addressed. They 
articulate how in the aftermath of trauma, grief and opportunity always coexist” 
(171).
 Thematically, Portraying 9/11 is concerned with collective grappling with 
national trauma. However, it is to its credit that none of the contributors reduce 
this wrestling to collective therapy. Instead, the critiques remain focused on 
the representations of trauma, grief, and identity making as politically charged 
processes. If there is one critique I would offer it is that the book ignores that 
ever powerful mode of public expression: television. By focusing on mostly 
high-culture texts, the book feels incomplete. Yes, there are multiple books that 
do consider the importance of television in creating and maintaining American 
identity post-9/11—including Terrorism TV—but when an anthology purports to 
examine representations in popular culture and ignores television, that is prob-
lematic. It should not, however, discourage those who wish to engage a work 
that explores a broad range of popular culture texts, even if the short chapters 
do not allow the authors to go much in depth with their respective topics. 
 What both of these books accomplish is to pay homage to the awful events 
that took place that Tuesday morning over a decade ago, without succumbing to 
the emotionalism that arguably contributed to the hyperbolic national response. 
Additionally, they demonstrate that popular culture can be a mirror and a vehicle 
of national healing and meaning making. We don’t just engage popular culture 
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to be entertained; we engage it to understand our experiences and ourselves. 
For these reasons, among others, popular culture artifacts deserve the scholarly 
attention they have been given in these books. The authors collectively respect 
purveyors and consumers of popular culture as not mindless drones of the sys-
tem, but rather, at times, using representations to offer sophisticated critiques of 
national policies. It is easy, and rather intellectually lazy, to read popular culture 
as only a vapid wasteland and only supporting hegemonic ideals. The scholars 
here avoid this trap. For that reason alone, those who study and consume popular 
culture will appreciate these additions to their library. For those in any disci-
plinary field who, at times, feel as though they search in vain for complexity in 
the scholarly treatment of popular culture, both of these books are reason for 
celebration.
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